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Roles for Evolving Markets, Policies, 
and Technology Improvements in 
U.S. Corn Ethanol Industry Development
Paul W. Gallagher
(Gallagher, 2004). A century of declining corn
prices and increasing petroleum prices has radi-
cally changed society’s technology options.
Still, the oil price spike of the late 1970s
(Figure 1) is a major event responsible for the
birth of the ethanol industry. Ethanol has recently
emerged as an equal partner among corn-using
industries during the oil price escalation of the early
twenty-first century. Technologies that improve
input costs or firm and marketing efficiency are
equally important in explaining the ethanol indus-
try’s birth and expansion because investment in a
new processing technology was required. In the
ethanol industry, firm strategies have emerged dur-
ing episodes of narrow profit margins.
P rofit assessments in the ethanol industrymust account for market and policydevelopments in the fuel and cornindustries because processors are posi-
tioned between both commodity markets. At the
beginning of the twentieth century, biofuel-based
industries such as ethanol were not feasible because
a pound of corn could be sold on the market and
exchanged for 5 to 7 pounds of petroleum at pre-
vailing market prices. It made more sense to pro-
duce the corn for feed and food, sell it for cash, and
buy petroleum to process for energy. The circum-
stances have since changed and today’s scenario
is quite different: One pound of corn can be
exchanged for only about one pound of petroleum
This article reviews changes in markets, technologies, and policies that affect corn ethanol profit -
ability and industry expansion. Historically, the corn ethanol industry was stimulated by high petro-
fuel prices, successful corn and processing technology improvements, and government incentives,
such as a blenders’ tax credit and mandated markets defined by the leaded fuel ban and reformu-
lated fuel. Presently, the corn ethanol industry has expanded slightly beyond the point of a normal
capital return, which is defined by limits on corn resource availability and ethanol marketing
infrastructure. A renewable fuel standard, included in a recent energy law, may eventually define
minimum consumption levels for ethanol and, implicitly, production levels for corn ethanol. Poten -
tially impending marketing changes, such as voluntary E20 (20 percent ethanol) sales or expanded
sales of E85-equipped automobiles, may expand ethanol markets. Potential technology advances
include growth of corn yields, corn-processing improvements for lower costs or higher revenue,
and development of a corn-stover (leaves and stalks)–based biomass industry. Government policies
to induce biomass-fuel capacity investment are economically justified and probably necessary if
biofuel industry development remains a public priority. Still, more efficient policy approaches
could be developed. (JEL Q11, Q42, Q48)
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This review of profitability in the ethanol indus-
try considers the combination of developments in
corn, fuel markets, and policy that led to the recent
ethanol expansion. Also, an estimation of the con-
tribution from past firm efficiency improvements
is presented as one important factor contributing to
the ethanol industry’s development. For the present
and intermediate future, overall profit and output
growth rates in the industry will likely be moderate
because of moderate supply growth for the corn
input and widening ethanol price discounts to com-
pete with gasoline. Thus, impending innovations
in production and marketing practices are also
reviewed for an indication of their profit-improving
potential in the current economic environment.
THE MARKETING-GOVERNMENT-
TECHNOLOGY MATRIX LEADING
TO THE CURRENT U.S. ETHANOL
INDUSTRY
Phases of the Ethanol Industry
Three phases of the U.S. corn ethanol industry
are discussed: birth, development, and maturity.
Birth. The right combination of petroleum
market and corn market events contributed to
the initial profitability and birth of the ethanol-
processing industry. In the petroleum market, the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) was still pursuing a high-price strategy as
a hangover from the 1970s. Meanwhile, corn prices
had declined considerably because the export
boom of the mid-1970s had collapsed (Figure 2).
A generous consumption subsidy in the form of
a blenders’ tax credit1 was still needed to achieve
profitability (Gill, 1987). Nonetheless, production
in the new ethanol industry had expanded to
nearly 0.75 billion gallons by 1989.
Development. OPEC changed its pricing strat-
egy in the mid-1980s (Stauffer, 1994). Then petro-
leum and fuel prices declined, which resulted in
a much narrower profit margin that allowed the
ethanol industry to become more competitive.
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Figure 1
Saudi Petroleum Prices (January 1970–December 2008)
1 A mixture (blend) of 10 percent ethanol and 90 percent gasoline is
suitable for most automobiles with gasoline engines. Initially, the
U.S. government granted a partial exemption to its gasoline excise
tax when an ethanol blend was sold because ethanol was typically
more expensive than gasoline. The partial exemption is equivalent
to an ethanol consumer subsidy (Gallagher, Shapouri, and Price,
2006b).
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Although this period was not profitable for ethanol
processing, the groundwork for future ethanol
profitability was laid. Three events stand out in
this developmental phase.
First, the ethanol industry initiated a series of
improvements that enhanced profitability with
the existing market prices for fuel and corn. For
instance, ethanol yields increased 10 percent
between 1984 and 2007. The processing yield
increase elevated profits by $0.31 per bushel.
Further, operating expenses decreased by about
50 percent since the late 1980s—energy efficiency
improved, labor needs declined, and the cost of
processing enzymes dropped (Gallagher, Shapouri,
and Brubaker, 2007); the reduction in operating
costs was $0.38/bu. Finally, dry mill processors
discovered that they could reduce their average
capital costs, or capital costs per unit of capacity,
by increasing the size of their plants (Gallagher,
Brubaker, and Shapouri, 2005; Gallagher, Shapouri,
and Brubaker, 2007). Elsewhere, I have estimated
that annual capital costs declined by $0.27/bu by
increasing the plant size from 4 million bu/yr to
19 million bu/yr. Together the yield improvements
and costs reductions increased the processing mar-
gin by $0.96/bu.
Second, since 1980 the corn market has slowly
but steadily changed so that ethanol processing is
now profitable. Specifically, corn production has
grown steadily with yield growth (~224 million
bu/yr) while demand growth has remained rela-
tively stable (110 million bu/yr). Export demands
have fluctuated from year to year but have exhib-
ited no growth since 1980. Moderate feed demand
growth reflected saturation of American diets,
limited success of trade negotiations in developed
country meat markets, and the shift in livestock
feed rations toward more protein (Gallagher, 2000).
Since 1980, new corn supplies have gradually
pushed corn prices down and pushed marginal
corn farmland into other crops. Otherwise stated,
the cumulated excess supply growth of corn could
supply about 8.0 billion gallons of new ethanol
capacity without increasing corn prices. In contrast,
ethanol capacity grew by about 1.5 billion gallons
by 2000.
Third, ethanol demand and prices got a major
boost when a legislated oxygen standard was intro-
duced to reformulated fuel in 1994 as part of the
Gallagher
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Figure 2
North Central Iowa Corn Prices (January 1970–December 2008)
a demand boost because of the MTBE phase-out—
the increase will add a total of 3.5 billion gallons
of ethanol demand when the 1998 level of MTBE
production is completely phased out. By 2000,
ethanol-processing margins had increased
(Figure 3). Further, returns on an equity investment
increased to respectable levels (~20 percent). Con -
sequently, ethanol output expanded to annual
production levels of about 1 billion gallons.
Second, petroleum prices crossed the thresh-
old of competition where ethanol could compete
directly with other additives in the petrochemical
industry (Gallagher et al., 2006a). By 2006, process-
ing margins widened, and the return on an equity
investment in an ethanol plant reached eye-catching
levels—60 percent—using current corn prices and
spot market ethanol prices.
A stunning expansion in ethanol output has
since occurred; output is about 8.5 billion gallons
for the recently completed 2007-08 corn market-
ing year (Figure 4). Also, the Renewable Fuels
1990 Clean Air Act (Gallagher et al., 2003). In effect,
the oxygen standard required that ethanol or methyl
tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE, an additive) be blended
in the gasoline “recipes” used for cleaner fuels in
major urban areas with smog problems. This
requirement increased the ethanol demand and
capacity by 0.90 billion gallons (Gallagher, Otto,
and Dikeman, 2000).
Maturity. Two events in fuel markets triggered
the large-scale expansions of the twenty-first cen-
tury. First, a “de facto” national ban on the use of
MTBE, the petroleum industry’s chemical for the
oxygen standard of reformulated fuel, evolved
through a series of public events. The national ban
evolved partly because several major states banned
MTBE after it was found in groundwater supplies
(Gallagher et al., 2000). Then the petroleum indus-
try was unable to obtain a waiver removing their
liability for leaking tanks, so the industry decided
to phase out MTBE. Ethanol, initially sharing the
reformulated fuel market, is still benefiting from
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Figure 3
Corn Ethanol Processing Margin and Costs for Dry Mills with Current Technology 
(January 1990–December 2008)
NOTE: *Includes electricity, fuel, labor, and chemicals. **Ethanol revenues plus DDG revenues less corn costs.
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Although several developments are responsible
for recent price increases, ethanol expansion was
an important cause.
Market equilibrium occurs because declining
output prices and increasing input prices squeeze
processors’ profit margin to the point that the
marginal processors’ return is exactly offset by
their costs. Indeed, the data do suggest an upward-
sloping processing supply curve with respect to
the processing price (margin): Ethanol price
increases (or corn input price decreases) represent
upward movements along the processing supply
curve (Figure 6 and Appendix A). For instance,
the October 2008 average processing margin less
operating cost (Mt; see Appendix A) was $0.72/bu
after corn prices fell to $3.73/bu, which is $0.02/bu
above the point of capital cost return. Accordingly,
processing near 80 percent utilization could be
expected, keeping ethanol prices at moderate levels.
During November and December 2008, the margin
was $0.136/bu to $0.293/bu less than the annual
capital cost on a new plant investment. Hence,
most plants continue to operate, but new capacity
Association (RFA, 2008) reported in October 2008
that ethanol production capacity is 10.26 billion
gallons, and the capacity will be 13.66 billion gal-
lons when the processing plants currently financed
or under construction are completed.
THE ETHANOL INDUSTRY’S 
CONTRIBUTION TO RESOLVING
THE GAP BETWEEN CORN
DEMAND AND ETHANOL 
PRODUCTION CAPACITY
Economic theory suggests that an expanding
industry pushes product prices down and input
prices up, at least to the extent that product demand
and input supply curves are not perfectly elastic.
Indeed, wholesale ethanol prices have declined
relative to gasoline prices—and even in absolute
terms recently (Figure 5). Also, corn prices at the
farm level have escalated from typical levels of
$2.50/bu a few years ago to $5.00/bu recently.
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U.S. Ethanol Production (and Changes)
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Figure 5
Wholesale Fuel Prices in Iowa (January 1995–December 2008)
plans were discouraged, as profits were not ade-
quate to repay the annual capital investment cost
of $0.70/bu.2
Another point to consider in estimating how
long it will take to restore a balance between ethanol
capacity and corn supply is the balance between
corn production growth and ethanol output growth.
Some exploratory calculations are given in Table 1.
These calculations exploit three assumptions: (i) an
80 percent utilization rate by ethanol processors con-
tinues, (ii) planned capacity is brought online at the
recent historical rate but no new production plans
are developed (see Appendix A and equation (A2)
for profitability calculations), and (iii) trend rates
of production and feed demand growth continue.
Starting with the recently completed 2007-08
crop year, corn production growth of 2,539 million
bushels was very large, partly because an additional
10.0 million acres of corn were planted. However,
the actual demand growth for 2007-08 was only
1,636 million bushels, so there was a market sur-
plus of 903 million bushels. For subsequent years,
80 percent of ethanol capacity utilization implies a
growth in processor demand of 598 million bushels
for 2008-09 and 568 million bushels for 2009-10.
The external corn production growth between
2008-09 and 2009-10 (325 million bushels) is cal-
culated as the trend yield growth (2.77 bu/acre/yr)
on the existing corn land base plus a small allow -
ance for increasing acreage devoted to corn.
The yearly market surplus for 2007-08 was 903
million bushels, but a deficit in production growth
is likely for 2008-09 and 2009-10. Thus, falling
inventories could be expected as surpluses and
inventories are used to fill the demand of additional
ethanol plants. However, the external production
growth driven by corn-yield growth will begin to
2 Editor’s note: The author has updated prices for this publication
since the presentation of the paper in November 2008.
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Ethanol Processing Supply, Unit Capital Cost, and Processing Equilibrium
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catch up with the ethanol-induced expansion in
corn demand by the 2010-11 crop year. The pro-
duction growth exceeds demand growth slightly
(by 179 million bushels) when ethanol processors
are operating at 80 percent of capacity. At that point,
increased profit margins pushed by declining corn
prices could begin to lift capacity utilization rates
of ethanol processors above the 80 percent rate.
Overall, the calculations in Table 1 suggest that the
net growth of the corn supply will catch up with
the planned ethanol capacity in about 3 years.
Clearing Up Some Misconceptions
The 2007-08 corn market year was one of major
forecasting mistakes and other market surprises.
First, a mood of hysteria prevailed when planting
decisions for the 2007-08 crop year were made. To
illustrate, recall that some analysts were suggesting
a 32 billion gallon corn ethanol industry by 2014
(Elobeid et al., 2006). If such a decade-long expan-
sion occurred at a linear rate, 3.1 billion gallons of
additional ethanol (or 1,150 million bushels of corn)
would have been required every year for a decade.
Another private forecast anticipated an ethanol
production increase of 4.5 billion gallons (1,681
million bushels) for the 2007-08 crop year (Tierney
and Gidel, 2006). Even the widely watched United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Supply
and Demand report estimated ethanol expansion
of 3.4 billion gallons (1,250 million bushels), which
was 41 percent above the actual expansion (Office
of Chief Economist’s Staff, 2007, 2008). It is likely
that errors occurred in the corn area (acres planted)
and inventory allocations for the 2007-08 crop year.
Further, corn prices were likely destabilized; the
demand overestimate ensured higher prices and
increased inventory carryout, but larger carryin
and lower prices for the subsequent market year
(Hyami and Peterson, 1972).
Table 1
Anticipated, Actual, and External Changes in Corn Demand and Production
External changes
Variable Anticipated changes Actual changes* Anticipated Anticipated Anticipated
Crop year 07/2008 07/2008 08/2009 09/2010 10/2011
Demand
Feed 110† 455‡ 110 110 110
Exports 0† 300 0 0 0
Ethanol 1,681§ 881 598 568 36
Subtotal 1,791 1,636 652 678 340
Production 1,664¶ 2,539 325# 325 325
Difference 127 903 –327 –353 179
Cumulation** 903 576 223 402
NOTE: Data assume 80 percent utilization of corn-processing capacity ($2.00/gal ethanol and $5.00/bu corn).
*Office of Chief Economist’s Staff, 2008.
†Trend rate of increase 1980-2006.
‡An increase of 176 million bushels can be attributed to meat export expansion.
§Per e-mail from R. Wisner and W. Tierney, December 29, 2006.
¶A trend yield increase of 2.77 bu/acre times an acreage base of 81.3 million acres (planted) in 2006, plus an anticipated planted acreage
increase of 10.0 million acres times a trend yield of 145 bu/planted acre.
#A trend yield increase of 2.77 bu/acre times an acreage base of 93.5 million acres (planted) in 2007, plus an anticipated planted acreage
increase of 0.46 million acres times a trend yield of 145 bu/planted acre.
**Implied inventory increase and/or price decline when positive.
Second, the actual feed expansion of 455 mil-
lion bushels was much higher than long-term trend
growth (110 million bushels) or early USDA projec-
tions would have indicated. Of the actual expan-
sion in feed demand, 175 million bushels can be
attributed to the feed needed for an expansion of
U.S. meat exports in pork, chicken, and beef. Both
the domestic livestock and foreign livestock com-
ponents of corn feed demand expanded more
rapidly than anticipated.
Third, corn export growth had been nonexistent
for 20 years, but the 2007-08 crop year saw a 300
million bushel expansion and a record export level.
The shift in corn exports can be explained mostly
by events and policy decisions in the European
Union (EU) and China. The EU had a production
shortfall of 257 million bushels between the 2006-07
and 2007-08 crop years. Furthermore, the EU made
up almost all of the domestic production shortfall
by increasing imports by 234 million bushels. This
is a well-known feature of EU policies—entire
shortfalls are made up on the world market because
domestic prices are insulated from fluctuations in
world commodity markets. China had no produc-
tion shortfall. However, given their rapidly growing
population, and perhaps the opportunity for a quick
profit by the state trading enterprise, exports from
China declined by 184 million bushels. Even though
the U.S. corn export increase may have been sold
to other countries, the shift in export position by
the EU and China can explain most of the increase
in U.S. export demand for corn.
The total demand shock that some analysts
feared did actually occur: The total demand shift,
initially forecast at 1,791 million bushels, was 1,636
million bushels. However, many accounts hold the
ethanol industry responsible. The main point is
that all three groups—meat exporters, large corn-
trading countries, and the ethanol industry—can-
not all expand at the same time. The corn market
is not large enough, as price behavior in the past
year has shown.
Corn inventory increased (by 320 million
bushels) during 2007-08. At first glance, an inven-
tory increase is not typical in a tight corn market.
But was the inventory higher than a well-functioning
competitive market would have delivered? Offset -
ting factors complicate the answer. For instance,
inventory holders with good foresight probably
could accumulate some inventories to cover the
anticipated bulge in ethanol demand over the next
three years or so, but several other factors point to
the possibility of excess inventory. Specifically, the
extent of the future demand expansion was over-
estimated, so futures prices were high. Also, corn
futures prices are systematically biased upward in
comparison with the actual cash prices in subse-
quent periods (Appendix B), so inventory holdings
based on the futures price were likely too high.
Finally, there was speculation related to macro-
economic concerns about commodity inflation,
which would encourage higher inventories unre-
lated to events in the commodity market. A quan-
titative analysis of the offsetting factors could be
definitive. In the meantime, circumstances seemed
to point toward overaccumulation of corn invento-
ries in the 2007-08 crop year.
Fortunately, corn producers responded with
more acreage in corn than many thought possible.
And good fortune prevailed with an actual produc-
tion increase that more than offset the demand
expansion. Prices were quite high for the 2007-08
marketing year, but they were still considerably
lower than they would have been had a produc-
tion shortfall occurred on top of a simultaneous
expansion in three market segments and excessive
inventories.
REORGANIZING THE ETHANOL
INDUSTRY FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY
Production Changes
The ethanol industry has changed considerably
during its expansion. First, production has become
more concentrated in the Midwestern United States
(Figure 7). Second, the ownership structure has
become less concentrated, which encourages fuel
pricing with competitive profit margins. Third,
ethanol markets have become more national in
scope. Arguably, all of these changes have improved
economic performance of the Midwestern economy
and provided substitutes for imported fuel.
Location of Production. Most new plants in the
rapidly expanding ethanol industry were placed
Gallagher
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Figure 7
Ethanol Biorefinery Locations
SOURCE: Renewable Fuels Association and Department of Economics, Iowa State University.
in the Midwest, where corn input supplies are
ample and cheap. Specifically, 65 percent of
ethanol plants are now located in seven Mid wes -
tern states (Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, and South Dakota).
The production expansion has provided a
larger economic base for the rural Midwest. The
direct effects of ethanol expansion include wages
at the processing plant, farm income derived from
additional corn sales, and expanded local trans-
portation. Secondary effects include multiplier
effects in retail and service sectors. Local economy
benefits of about $0.20/gallon and reduced fuel
consumption expenditures offset the cost of ethanol
subsidies (Gallagher, Otto, and Dikeman, 2000).
Some ethanol plants are now near product mar-
kets. Locations in Texas, Oregon, and Washington
are near ethanol markets and by-product distillers’
grains (DG) feed markets. Here, the higher corn
costs are offset by the DG drying costs avoided by
local feed markets. Also, ethanol transport costs
are avoided for refiners with blending requirements
from the renewable fuels standard (RFS). Five per-
cent of the ethanol plants in the United States are
in Texas, Oregon, California, and Washington.
Ownership Structure. The ethanol industry
that has emerged from the rapid expansion has a
less concentrated ownership structure. Three
equally large firms combined now control about
40 percent of the market, and each has about 12
percent of the market. In contrast, one firm alone
controlled 40 percent of the market in 2000
(Table 2). The remaining smaller firms represented
about 60 percent of the market in both periods.
However, the share of locally owned firms (i.e.,
firms owned by residents or farmers in the local
community where the plant is located) today is 12
percent—down from 26 percent before the expan-
sion in 2000. Externally owned firms now (as of
2008) supply about 47 percent of the capacity, a
heightened presence in the industry. Dispersed
firms and diverse ownership encourages compe-
tition in the ethanol market.
Ethanol Markets. Distinguishing between
additive and commodity fuel markets for ethanol
is useful in understanding episodes of ethanol pre-
miums or discounts relative to gasoline. In the
additive market, blending restrictions on scarce
quality attributes (e.g., octane and/or oxygen) can
create market premiums for ethanol over commod-
ity gasoline (Gallagher et al., 2003). In the commod-
ity fuel market, because high ethanol concentration
reduces fuel economy, the market discounts
ethanol relative to gasoline (Gallagher, 2007).
Gallagher
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Table 2
Ownership of U.S. Ethanol Capacity in 2000 and 2008
December 2000 December 30, 2008
Operating Operating After building
Ownership (million gallons) Share (0/1) (million gallons) (million gallons) Share (0/1)
Large firms
Abengoa 0 0 168 344 0.026
Archer Daniels Midland 797 0.397 1,070 1,620 0.122
Hawkeye Renewables 0 — 440 440 —
POET (Broin) 7 0.004 1,467 1537 0.116
VeraSun 0 — 7,80 880 0.066
Subtotal (large firms) 804 0.401 3,925 4,821 0.364
Small firms
Farmer/local 529 0.264 1,698 1,898 0.143
External 681 0.339 5,216 6,516 0.493
Subtotal (small firms) 1,210 0.603 6,914 8,414 0.636
Total—United States 2,007 1.000 10,839 13,235 1.000
Gallagher
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Historically, ethanol sold at premiums over
gasoline during the replacement of MTBE. More
recently, ethanol premiums have turned to dis-
counts relative to gasoline as marketed ethanol
volume surpassed the MTBE replacement threshold.
Initially, larger sales volumes had to deal with
transportation bottlenecks. More recently, ethanol
discounts relative to gasoline have stemmed from
lower-valued uses in E10 and E85 (see Figure 5).
In the coastal urban areas of the United States,
federal regulations were probably responsible for
oxygen-based ethanol premiums. For instance,
reformulated fuel has an oxygen content standard
that is satisfied by a 5.5 percent ethanol blend in
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)–designated
markets. For instance, the major population centers
in New York, California, and Texas are required to
follow the restrictions of reformulated fuel. Even
though the oxygen standard was repealed in the
Energy Policy Act of 2005, ethanol demand
remained high (2.0 billion gallons) in these major
population centers during 2006.
Much of the ethanol is voluntarily blended in
the Midwest (with subsidy).3 It has been blended
at 10 percent concentration (E10) for 20 years
because EPA regulations assume that 10 percent is
the maximum level that is compatible with conven-
tional gasoline engines and ignition systems (EPA,
1995). More recent blends of ethanol (up to 85
percent ethanol concentration [E85]) can be used
in gasoline engines with modified fuel and ignition
systems. Both products are available at retail gaso-
line outlets around the Midwest. Six million flexible-
fuel vehicles (FFVs, which are E85-compatible) are
currently in use in the United States. These FFVs
could consume up to 6.0 billion gallons of ethanol
if fully fueled by E85 blends (based on 15,000 miles
driven per car/yr and an average of 15 mpg). Since
2005 and through 2010, blenders of E10 and E85
receive a blenders’ credit on the U.S. gasoline excise
tax equal to $0.51/gallon of ethanol used (RFA,
2009).
During the past two years, ethanol price dis-
counts against gasoline have been common (see
Figure 5A). Further, the discounts have tended to
widen as the volume of ethanol marketed has
increased. In fact, my estimate of the ethanol price
elasticity (E ) of demand with a fixed gasoline price
is E = 1.04 (see Appendix A, Ethanol Price Dis -
counts). The implication is that revenues tend to
remain about constant with increased marketed
volume. Reasons for this price discounting include
the fact that the requirements of the octane deficit
and the E10 market in some Midwestern states have
been surpassed. Also, the marketing and consump-
tion infrastructure for using higher ethanol concen-
trations (gas stations and FFVs) is limited. Marketing
practices and government policy are likely to
evolve with the combination of price discounting
and expanding supplies.
The recent situation was useful because wide
price discounts encourage construction of E85 retail
outlets. In addition, a subsidy encourages construc-
tion of E85 retail fueling stations.4 But accelerated
adoption of FFV technology by consumers will
occur only with sustained consumer incentives,
such as E85 retailing margins that more closely
reflect gasoline retailing margins or a consumers’
income tax credit for using ethanol instead of a
blenders’ tax credit. Rapid adoption of FFV tech-
nology given the market conditions of December
2008 is unlikely—Iowa’s wholesale price for regular
gasoline of $1.06/gallon was slightly higher than
the implied wholesale E85 price, but only after
the $0.51/gallon is subtracted from the weighted
ethanol-gasoline price of $1.51/gallon.
Another alternative is voluntary or mandated
use of E20 (20 percent ethanol blend in gasoline)
in non-FFV vehicles. A drivability study suggests
that E20 could be used in conventional automobiles
without mechanical problems (Kittleson, Tan, and
Zarling, 2007). A preliminary emissions test of E20
in 13 late-model (2002 and 2007) vehicles found that
(i) there were no statistically significant increases
in EPA-regulated auto emissions and some of the
regulated emissions actually decreased and (ii) the
catalytic converter was consistently cooler for all
vehicles, except for a subset of lean-running vehi-
cles during a wide-open-throttle hill-climbing
3 At moderate and high gasoline prices, ethanol is competitive without
the subsidy; but at low gasoline prices, an ethanol subsidy is required
to maintain competitiveness (Gallagher et al., 2006a).
4 A 30 percent income tax credit up to $30,000 is available until 2010
to businesses that install clean-fuel (including E85) vehicle-refueling
equipment (RFA, 2009).
experiment (West et al., 2008). Incidental fuel econ-
omy calculations from these two studies are mixed;
however, a test of late-model vehicles suggests that
fuel economy holds up with E20 (Shockey et al.,
2007). The E20 blend remains a competitive sub-
stitute for premium gasoline with the market con-
ditions of December 2008—Iowa’s wholesale price
for premium gasoline was $1.29/gallon and corre-
sponding E20 prices were $1.14/gallon without the
subsidy and $1.06/gallon with the subsidy (see
Figure 5b).
Marketing policies that encourage E20 or E85
use may reduce ethanol price discounting against
gasoline by encouraging ethanol-for-gasoline sub-
stitution and expanding ethanol demand. However,
additional testing to determine vehicle classes and
locations that are suitable for E20 is still needed.
The Renewable Fuels Standard. Impending
consumption mandates are a second avenue that
could boost future ethanol price and demand.
Since 2004, an RFS potentially mandates minimum
consumption levels for renewable fuels. A mini-
mum level for corn ethanol consumption is also
implied but has not yet bound the minimum
level of corn ethanol demand (EPA, 2008; Federal
Register, 2008; Christian, 2008). Similarly, mini-
mum corn ethanol demand from an RFS is not
likely to bind supply for the next few years,
according to my calculations based on the 2008
policy rule (Table A1). The existing RFS minimum
consumption levels for renewable fuels will likely
not constrain the ethanol supply until after 2011
(see Figure 4). If the corn supply continues to grow,
however, margins would improve and increase
capacity utilization rates toward 100 percent.
The RFS seems to function as a government
“investment signal” that defines a potential mini-
mum market size in the future. Indeed, as noted in
Table A1, by 2016 the corn ethanol required for the
RFS (13.5 billion gallons) almost exactly matches
the “after building” capacity shown at the bottom
of Table 2 (13.2 billion gallons). Hence, the RFS
has been a second-best investment policy that sig-
nals potential government support of ethanol prices
and offsets some of the risk associated with biofuels
investment. The risk justification for the RFS fits
Gallagher
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to the extent that there are no well-functioning
futures markets for forward pricing.
Presently, the RFS also influences the spatial
pattern of ethanol use and prices. Refiners now
have a renewable volume obligation (RVO) to (i)
prove their own ethanol blending at the refinery
(refiners can fulfill their RVO through the purchase
of ethanol with renewable inventory number [RIN]
certificates) or (ii) prove another blender’s use of
ethanol through the purchase of that blender’s RIN
number (RFA, 2008; EPA, 2007).
A look at recent spot market price spreads
between Texas and Iowa shows how prices may
have been influenced by policies and rapid expan-
sion of ethanol consumption. Initially, margins
were wide, but recent margins are about equal to
ethanol transportation costs from Iowa to the Texas
Gulf Coast, about $0.05/gallon (Figure 8). Finally,
the recent market value of RIN certificates was
also about $0.05/gallon. Apparently, arbitrage has
forced equality between the cost of transporting
ethanol with an RIN number to a coastal refinery
and the market purchase price of an RIN certificate.
FIRM-LEVEL STRATEGIES TO
REDUCE PROCESSING COSTS 
OR INCREASE REVENUES
Today’s narrow margins have induced the
development of new technologies and new firm
organizations. Seven approaches are listed in
Table 3. Together, these modifications have the
potential to reduce ethanol production costs by at
least $0.50/gallon. However, some of these cost
reductions merely offset recent cost increases that
have occurred elsewhere. Further, individual
firms may use only some and not all of the new
technologies.
Early adoption of high-starch corn varieties
for ethanol processing is likely because no capital
outlay is required. Typically, high-starch corn will
increase the ethanol yield and revenues but decrease
by-product (DG) yield and revenues. On balance,
the ethanol yield gain from a starch increase offsets
the DG loss.
Most new technologies require capital expen-
diture to retrofit the plant. For instance, biomass
power requires the installation of a boiler or gasifier
in the ethanol plant instead of gas turbines and
market purchases of electricity—a choice that could
increase ethanol-plant costs by 50 percent. How -
ever, the long-term benefit—replacing more expen-
sive natural gas—could reduce processing costs
by as much as $0.19/gallon.
Another capital-using, but potentially profit -
able, set of technology options separates elements
from the DG by-product stream. The dry fractiona-
tion process for a dry mill, which separates bran,
grits, and germ in the initial grinding phase, requires
additional capital investment, but additional rev-
enues are obtained by producing ethanol from the
fiber and a food-grade corn oil from the germ. There
are also other processes that extract oil from the DG
stream with a smaller capital investment (Taylor
et al., 2001). Reduced fiber and oil content in DG
is more palatable to livestock and can be fed at a
higher (feed per animal) rate.
Retrofitting an ethanol plant to produce butanol
is also a possibility. Weighed against the cost of
conversion, the benefits would be the increased
Table 3
Ethanol-Processing Firms: Proposed
Strategies for Increased Profits
Cost reduction or
Strategies net revenue increase ($/gal)
Cost-reducing technology
High-starch corn 0.130*
Biomass power 0.191†
Revenue-increasing technology
Dry fractionization —
Quick germ process 0.039‡
Fiber extraction —
Business reorganization
Improved diversification 0.072§
Local producer/processor 0.042¶
SOURCE: *Gallagher, Schamel, Shapouri, et al. (2006a, p. 125).
†Gallagher, Schamel, Shapouri, et al. (2006a, p. 127).
‡Taylor et al. (2001).
§Gallagher, Shapouri, and Brubaker (2007, p. 76).
¶Gallagher, Shapouri, and Brubaker (2007, p. 75).
price for butanol. Butanol is an attractive blending
agent to some gasoline processors because its lower
vapor pressure allows more butane use in the fuel.
Modifying the business organization also has
profit-increasing potential. For instance, the inter-
est rate charged to an ethanol enterprise in a well-
diversified portfolio should be about 3 percentage
points lower than a stand-alone ethanol enterprise
because the risk premium is lower. In turn, the
reduced interest cost would translate to a $0.07/
gallon reduction in annual capital costs for the
premium.
Finally, a producer-owned enterprise with a
combination of firm and cooperative practices could
increase the overall farm/processor return in the
local production area by about $0.015/gallon. The
increase occurs because the input market area of
the processor can be extended beyond the boundary
of the traditional competitive firm for higher joint
profits.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In the broadest sense, the ethanol industry owes
its existence to increasing petroleum prices and a
highly successful corn technology industry that
sustained corn yield growth in a stagnant market
for two decades. The industry has been supported
along the way by a complete array of government
policies: Consumption subsidies, import duties,
and minimum consumption requirements have
all supported the demand for ethanol during the
industry development phase.
During the past few years, the ethanol-processing
industry overexpanded somewhat. First, ethanol
sales are large in relation to existing marketing
infrastructure and ethanol-using technology.
Second, the ethanol-processing expansion is some-
what larger than the corn input market that can be
sustained without large-scale displacement of com-
peting uses of corn. Signs already indicate that new
capacity plans for ethanol will not be brought to the
market for a while. Instead, existing capacity plans
will likely be completed. Also, existing plants will
likely operate below capacity for a few more years
before the balance between ethanol capacity and
corn supply is restored.
For the near future, a shift from mandated
regional use defined by the RFS and toward volun-
tary marketing of E85 and E20 in the Midwest may
improve ethanol sector profits and economic effi-
ciency generally. Consumer use of E20 is expected
to grow because currently the price of this premium-
grade fuel is lower than comparable gasoline, even
with recent low gasoline prices. However, EPA
regulations that limit ethanol blending to 10 percent
in conventional automotives must first be relaxed.
In preliminary testing, E20 drivability and emis-
sions results are encouraging, but further evalua-
tion is needed to precisely define the automobiles
and locations compatible with E20 use.
Improved production management that
squeezes more profits from the existing capacity
warrants closer scrutiny in the near future. Given
the success of past innovations, the early adopters
of new technologies are expected to thrive. Inno va -
tions by processors will reduce the margin between
corn ethanol and gasoline markets, which in turn,
will reduce fuel prices and improve consumer wel-
fare and increase corn prices and improve farm
incomes.
The longer-run prospects for corn ethanol
expansion will be defined by technologies, market
events, and policy choices. For instance, more rapid
ethanol growth would be possible with acceler-
ated corn yield growth. But eventually, profitabil-
ity would still be restored if petro-fuel markets
remained above recent thresholds of ethanol com-
petition and corn yields grew at historical rates.
On the other hand, corn ethanol expansion may
hinge on some complex policy choices in the corn
market. For instance, whether the United States
should continue to accommodate the destabilizing
behavior of our large trading partners is debatable.
Similarly, a prolonged meat export expansion, if
it should occur, could carry some adverse conse-
quences. To wit, our land may be approaching its
manure-carrying capacity after decades of already
expanding meat exports. Also, the expansion of
meat exports would likely reduce the carbon diox-
ide balance and future policies may begin to limit
carbon emissions. In contrast, an expanding ethanol
industry could improve the carbon balance. A bal-
ance of payments gain from petroleum import
substitution is also likely.
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The development of stover-to-ethanol technol-
ogy would benefit society in several ways. Use of
the sustainable portion of the stover supplies would
increase ethanol production in the Corn Belt states
by 12 billion gallons and, in turn, increase the U.S.
fuel supply by 4 percent of petroleum production
and reduce U.S. petroleum prices by 6 percent,
yielding a net annual welfare gain to the U.S. econ-
omy of $3.2 billion (Gallagher and Johnson, 1999).
Importantly, feed/food and fuel production could
become complementary instead of potentially com-
petitive because corn and stover are joint products
(National Research Council, 2000).
If left to market forces, the rate and scale of the
development of biomass ethanol processing (such
as stover-to-ethanol) could be impeded, which
underscores the need for government involvement.
First, industrial policy could prevent the duplica-
tion of investment and dilution of returns under
competition and therefore improve the public good
by encouraging development of new processing
technology at a lower cost (Krugman, 1983). But
later, new patents could define monopoly power
for technology owners and retard adoption. Second,
increased biofuel development/usage would have
positive externalities for the environment; for
instance, corn ethanol contributes to improvements
in greenhouse emissions (Gallagher and Shapouri,
2009). Also, ethanol has contributed to urban air
quality improvements (Gallagher et al., 2008). Third,
private sector evaluations of the fuel markets do not
fully account for the potential of biofuels to stem
the macroeconomic instability imposed by petro-
leum markets and OPEC market power (Gallagher
and Johnson, 1999). Fourth, government involve-
ment may lessen the fear of the substantial risks
in biofuel processing in the volatile fuel and agri-
cultural markets, thus encouraging innovations.
Fifth, new fuel-processing investments directed
solely by oil sector profits would deliver the highest
profits for petroleum resources—and perhaps for
the world economy—but U.S. interests would not
necessarily also be served.
The United States now pursues two policies that
promote the development of biomass-processing
capacity. First, the RFS defines minimum levels of
biomass-fuel production for the next 15 years (RFA,
2007). Second, government subsidies for the con-
struction of a few biomass-processing facilities have
been provided (U.S. Department of Energy, 2007).
Generally speaking, capital subsidies may make
more economic sense than market mandates
because (i) the full extent of the public commitment
is defined up front with a capital subsidy and (ii)
the annual revision of minimum production levels
in a political process under the RFS is discarded
in favor of a market-based determination of fuel
production. A shift toward the capital subsidy, and
away from the production mandate, would likely
improve economic efficiency.
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APPENDIX A
Processing Supply Estimate
A statistical estimate of the processing supply function is denoted as follows:
R2 = 0.50 
root mean square error = 0.099
The numbers in parentheses below the coefficients are t-values.
Variable Definitions
Ut = utilization rate = Qet/St
Qet = ethanol production (billions of gallons)
St = ethanol production (billions of gallons)
Mt = margin less operating costs ($/bu of corn processed)
Pet = ethanol price in Iowa ($/gallon)
Yet = ethanol yield (2.7 gallons/bu corn)
Pdg = DG price ($/lb)
Ydt = Dg yield (1.75 lb/bu)
Pct = Corn price ($/bu)
Copt = operating (non-corn) costs ($/bu)
Capacity Adjustment
The estimate of ethanol capacity investment suggests that capacity responds to profits. ∆St, the rate
of capacity increase, will slow and eventually cease when zero profits are sustained.
The estimate is
Historical Period (Annual Data): 1987-2008
Variable Definitions
∆st = st – st–1, and st = lnSt 
π t = Mt – kt
kt = unit capital cost ($/bu corn processed)
The constant, which suggests a steady rate of capacity increase when profits are zero, was not statisti-
cally significant in preliminary regressions, so it was discarded.
To see how capacity might adjust after 2008, notice that
St/St–1 = e
0.043πSt–1/St–2 
0.697.
U M Mt t t= +( ) ( )
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2. . – .
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Next, notice that S08/S07 = 1.36, and suppose that π t = 0 is sustained for several years. Then (1 plus)
the percentage increase in capacity for the next 5 years would be
2009: 1.360.697 = 1.24,
2010: 1.240.697 = 1.16,
2011: 1.160.697 = 1.11,
2012: 1.110.697 = 1.07, and
2013: 1.070.697 = 1.05.
Thus, the rate of capacity increase would be only 5 percent after the 2012 crop year.
Suppose prices fall to variable costs (π t = –0.7). Then (1 plus) the percentage increase in capacity for
the next 5 years would be expressed as follows:
2009: 0.97 × 1.360.697 = 1.21,
2010: 0.97 × 1.210.697 = 1.11,
2011: 0.97 × 1.110.697 = 1.04,
2012: 0.97 × 1.000.697 = 1.00, and
2013: 0.97 × 1.070.697 = 0.97.
Thus, capacity decreases by 3 percent after the 2012 crop year.
Ethanol Price Discounts
In a market with well-informed consumers and uniform blending of ethanol into gasoline, the per-
centage price discount of ethanol compared with gasoline is positively related to the ethanol blending
rate (Gallagher, 2007). Statistically, the ethanol price discount can be explained by ethanol’s share of the
gasoline marketing volume:
Historical Period (Monthly Data): 2000-08
Variable Definitions
dt = Pgt – Pet /Pgt
r, where
Pgt = wholesale price for regular gasoline in Iowa ($/gallon)
Pgt
r = retail price for regular gasoline in Iowa ($/gallon)
Xt = Det/Dgt
Det = ethanol demand in period t (billions of gallons)
Dgt = gasoline demand in period t (billions of gallons)
In general, the price elasticity of ethanol demand from the price-discount estimate is
Using data from October 2008 yields the following:
d X
R R
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APPENDIX B
In a widely used test of future market performance, Tomek and Gray (1970) proposed a regression
comparison of actual post-harvest cash prices and the futures price quotation in the planting period for
delivery in the post-harvest period. To update, we used the following regression:
where Pct+1 is the actual corn cash price (December futures price) on December 11 (November 18 for 2008)
of the following crop year, Pft
t+1 is the April 30 corn futures price for delivery in the following December,
and εt is a random disturbance term.
The idea is that the parameters take on particular values when the futures market is performing ade-
quately. Specifically, α = 0 and β = 1 when futures prices are an unbiased forecast of the upcoming market
price.
The significance of this result is that economic agents who use the futures price as an expected price
can shed the risk associated with production or inventory holding under uncertainty (Holthausen, 1979).
Further, the producer who sees future output on future markets will, on average, produce the same output
or hold the same inventory as a risk-neutral agent.
Pc Pft t
t
t+
+
= + +1
1α β ε ,
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Table A1
RFS for Renewable Biofuel and Its Components
Actual 
Corn Soy oil for Biodiesel anticipated
Renewable Biodiesel Ethanol ethanol biodiesel production Biodiesel corn
Year biofuel* credit imports† production (bil lb) (bil gal)‡ RFS credit§ production
2006 4.00 0.73 0.19 3.09 3.10 0.43 0.73 4.86
2007 4.70 0.73 0.22 3.75 3.10 0.43 0.73 6.49
2008 9.00 0.73 0.47 7.80 3.10 0.43 0.73 8.49
2009 10.50 0.73 0.55 9.22 3.10 0.43 0.73 9.97
2010 12.00 0.73 0.64 10.63 3.10 0.43 0.73 10.93
2011 12.60 0.73 0.67 11.20 3.10 0.43 0.73 10.93
2012 13.20 0.73 0.71 11.76 3.10 0.43 0.73
2013 13.80 0.73 0.74 12.33 3.10 0.43 0.73
2014 14.40 0.73 0.77 12.90 3.10 0.43 0.73
2015 15.00 0.73 0.81 13.46 3.10 0.43 0.73
2016 15.00 0.73 0.81 13.46 3.10 0.43 0.73
NOTE: All production data listed in billions of gallons unless otherwise stated.
*Defined by Energy Independence and Security Act (2007).
†Six percent of corn ethanol production.
‡0.43 bu/gal biodiesel = 3.10 billion lb soy oil × 0.985 lb biodiesel/1 lb soy oil  × 1 gal biodiesel/7.114 lb biodiesel .
§1.7 × biodiesel production.
We estimated the following price relationship for the 1980-81 to 2007-08 period:
t-Tests reject the unbiased futures price hypothesis. The statistic is tα = 3.0 under the null hypothesis
that α = 0. Similarly, the test statistic is tβ = 4.37 under the null hypothesis that β = 1.
The upshot is that the springtime futures price tends to be above the actual cash price, especially when
futures prices are above their mean for the historical period (Figure B1), so corn producers can increase their
average returns by forward pricing in the futures market. In contrast, corn users such as ethanol plants
will reduce their average returns by forward pricing in the futures market.
Oddly, the variability in the springtime futures price is higher (SD = $0.80/bu) than the variability of
the December cash price (SD = $0.63/bu). Hence, routine hedging by producers or consumers would tend
to be more risky than unhedged sales or purchases on the cash market.
For comparison, Tomek and Gray (1970) found that the corn futures market performed well over the
1952-68 period. That is, estimated values approximately verified the unbiased forecast result with α = 0
and β = 1. Furthermore, the SD of the cash price exceeded the SD of the futures price, so using the futures
reduced price variability.
Overall, results suggest that the corn futures market performed better in the 1952-68 period. For reasons
to explain the difference, notice that trading was limited to futures contracts in the early period and specu-
lators focused mainly on upcoming corn market conditions. In contrast, options and derivatives trading
was prevalent over the past two decades. Further, speculation on the macroeconomic inflation rates in
commodity markets has become commonplace in recent years.
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Figure B1
Corn Futures Prices, Cash Prices, and Cash Price Predictions
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